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Caribbean currencies 
 
By DeLisle WORRELL1a†  
 
Abstract. The currencies of Caribbean countries have now outlived their usefulness, and 
have become a liability. They were devised at a time when most payments were made 
using notes and coin, issued in distant metropolitan centres. Scarcity of the means of 
payment was a severe hindrance to commerce. In response Currency Boards were set up, 
to issue local currency as needed in the colonies. The system worked well because the local 
currency issue was backed by an equivalent value of Sterling, in a global system of fixed 
exchange rates. In contrast, nowadays payments are made mostly by electronic 
communication, credit and debit cards, cheques and drafts, with settlement over digitized 
bank accounts. In today’s world an own currency has become a liability for small 
economies, limiting access to international goods and services, exposing residents to risks 
of currency devaluation and inflation, eroding the value of domestic savings, increasing 
economic inequalities, providing a tool for unproductive government spending, and 
diverting attention from the need to increase productivity and enhance international 
competitiveness. 
Keywords. Dollarisation, Exchange rate, Fixed exchange rate, Foreign currency, Currency 
board, Open economy. 
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1. Introduction  
hose of you who are fans of Netflix may have come across a mystery 
series entitled “Hinterland”, which is set in the Welsh countryside. 
Several of the characters speak the Welsh language, y Gymraeg, and the 
series has a Welsh title, Y Gwyll. Had this series been issued only with its 
Welsh title, and had the Welsh dialogue not been subtitled, we would never 
have heard of it, and it would never have appeared on Netflix. Having your 
own native language is a source of pride, but if it is the only language you 
speak, your life chances are severely limited. In contrast, native English 
speakers in Trinidad or Barbados have unlimited possibilities for education, 
travel and migration, and an infinitely rich universe of information and 
communication. 
Having your own currency is rather like having your own language: if 
our people only have access to Trinidad-Tobago dollars or Barbados dollars, 
there is very little economic activity of any kind that they can undertake. 
Even basic subsistence farming requires forks and hoes, which use metals 
that are not found in these parts. The production of every product or service 
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in the local economy involves the use of fuels and other imported inputs, 
which must ultimately be sourced in foreign currency. In addition, the great 
majority of consumer goods are imported, and those which are not, are 
produced with the use of imported inputs. If all we have is local currency, 
we can neither produce nor consume. Small modern economies are fuelled 
by foreign exchange: they can sustain the quality of life for residents only by 
maintaining the inflow of foreign currency; and they grow the economy by 
increasing the amount of foreign currency they earn or borrow.  
Currencies served a crucial purpose when they were first introduced ... 
Why then do we have local currencies, if what matters for our wellbeing 
and increased prosperity is the US dollar, the euro or the renminbi yuan? To 
understand why we have local currencies, we need to go back in history, to 
a time when banking services were not widely available. Up until the 1960s 
in most Caribbean countries, all retail transactions and many wholesale 
transactions were settled with notes and coins. The means of payment were 
always scarce in those days, because our countries are so distant from the 
European capitals that issued the world’s major currencies. Reports from the 
colonies of European nations in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the 17th, 
18th and 19th centuries are replete with complaints about the shortage of the 
means of payment, and the stifling effects on commerce and industry 
(Armstrong, 2010). In the English Caribbean colonies, people were forced to 
resort to expedient measures: Spanish pesos were more readily available 
than English coins, but a single peso would frequently exceed the value of a 
prospective transaction. The custom arose of dividing the peso into eight 
equal segments. The “piece of eight” was in fact a Spanish peso that was 
valued at eight “bits”. 
The currency scarcity in the Caribbean was somewhat alleviated with the 
arrival of banking services in the 19th century (Bulmer-Thomas, 2012, pages 
139, 271). Payments could now be made by means of a written instruction to 
a bank. The cheque instructs the bank to make a deduction from the buyer's 
monies that had previously been deposited with them, when the seller 
presents that instruction. It obviates the need for currency, for those with 
bank accounts. 
But banks were few and far between, and most people did not have a bank 
account. They needed a secure payment instrument that could be used by 
anyone who did not have a bank deposit. In other words, a unit of currency. 
Currency notes were much cheaper to manufacture and transport than were 
coins, and, like cheques, they could be made in high denominations. A gold 
coin of equivalent value would be very much more expensive to store, 
transport and keep secure.  
In the first half of the 20th century it became commonplace in countries of 
the British Empire to issue local currency notes and coins, with values fixed 
to Sterling (for the most part; the Bahamas and Bermuda were exceptions). 
These currencies were issued by special Government departments, termed 
Currency Boards. The Currency Board held an amount of Sterling with the 
Bank of England or with the British Crown Agents, and issued an equivalent 
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amount of local currency. In this way the amount of the local currency issue 
could be more easily tailored to local needs. In the Caribbean there were 
Currency Boards covering the Lesser Antilles and British Guiana; Jamaica 
and the Caymans; the Bahamas; British Honduras (Belize) and Bermuda 
(IMF 1999a, 1999b).  
Up until 1971, all currency values were fixed, and those values, including 
Sterling, were ultimately determined by the US dollar value of an ounce of 
gold. In such a system, local currencies played a vital role in providing a 
secure means of payment, one that had a known, dependable and unvarying 
value. Currency notes circulated widely in the population in the process of 
buying and selling, available to anyone who needed to make a payment of 
any kind. Apart from businesses and wealthy households, everyone used 
currency make payments. 
In contrast, in today’s world, few transactions of any consequence are 
settled with the use of notes and coins, and the issue of currency is typically 
a small proportion of the total money supply and transactions value in any 
modern economy. Most payments, however initiated, are settled 
electronically, and end with a computer record in the seller's bank that shows 
a deposit increase, and a computer record in the purchaser's bank that shows 
a deposit loss or credit increase, of equivalent value. That is so whether the 
means of payment is an instruction sent from a computer, a credit or debit 
card, a cheque or any other means of payment, other than an exchange of 
notes and coins.  
Up until 1971 the values of all Caribbean currencies were known and 
unchanging. The international economy of the time operated on what was 
referred to as a de facto US dollar standard. The US dollar, whose value was 
set by the Federal Reserve at 35 dollars per troy ounce of gold, was already 
the most widely used international currency. All other currencies, including 
Sterling, were priced in terms of US dollars. The British West Indian dollar, 
which was the currency in use in the Lesser Antilles and British Guyana until 
1965, was issued by a Currency Board with headquarters in Port-of-Spain, at 
an unvarying value of BWI$4.80 to Sterling. Its value in US dollars was 
derived from the Sterling-US rate, which was changed only once in the post-
1945 period, in 1967. 
This system worked well, so long as currencies were anchored on a single 
universally used reference, the US dollar price of an ounce of gold. In this 
sense, the currency system resembled systems of weights and measures, 
such as kilometres or kilograms. However, the whole system of currency 
values fell apart when the US effectively moved off the Gold Standard at the 
time of the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971 (Eichengreen, 2011). 
(The Agreement, between the G-10 nations, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US, was for 
a change in the US dollar value of gold to 38 dollars, and there were several 
subsequent devaluations. In October 1976 reference to gold was removed 
from the definition of the dollar, long after it had ceased to be relevant.) For 
a time Caribbean currencies remained linked to Sterling, but most external 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
 D. Worrell, JEB, 8(3), 2021, p.171-184. 
174 
transactions were in US dollars, particularly on the import side. This caused 
inflation locally every time Sterling depreciated against the US, and one by 
one the Caribbean currencies switched to a US dollar peg (Worrell, 1987, 
pages 64, 104, 126).  
... but domestic currencies are a nuisance in today’s world 
The world of commerce and finance today bears no resemblance to the 
world for which Caribbean currencies were devised. Currency notes and 
coin, mostly of uncertain value in terms of purchasing power of the everyday 
goods and services we need to source abroad, are little used domestically. 
Mostly we use electronic transfers, cheques and credit cards. Since these are 
all computer records, it is immaterial how they are denominated, so long as 
both ends of every transaction match. There is no reason to link the 
denomination of the electronic transactions to the value of notes and coins. 
We continue to do electronic payments in local currency only because we 
have not thought deeply about the problem. We refer to notes, coins and 
bank deposits as "money", and we use that term as a synonym for "currency". 
The proverbial man from Mars would find that perplexing: currency and 
bank deposits both may be used for making payments, but they are clearly 
two very different ways of making payments. Bank deposits may be 
precisely defined electronically; their value may be derived precisely from 
instructions about how the electronic record is to be read. That record may 
be rendered either as an amount of Trinidad-Tobago dollars, or an amount 
of US dollars or a multiple of TT dollars. That multiple is currently about 6.8, 
I believe. I can see no reason why that multiple should ever change, or why 
we should bother to define the electronic record in anything other than US 
dollars. 
Notes and coins are another matter altogether. Jamaican currency can 
only be used to settle transactions in Jamaica. If the payee is in the US, the 
holder of Jamaican dollars must seek a supplier of US dollars who is willing 
to sell, and pay whatever is the going price. With the demise of the US dollar 
standard, there is no certainty about how that price may fluctuate. 
Experience with currencies of small countries worldwide shows that they all 
lose value over the long term, in some cases drastically so. Because the notes 
and coins lose value, there is no reason deposits should decline in value 
equivalently. Deposits with banks are matched with an equal or greater 
value of credit on the asset side of the balance sheet. They may therefore be 
denominated in US dollars rather than local currency, so long as an 
equivalent amount of credit is simultaneously denominated in US dollars. 
Nothing changes.2 
 
2. The problems of having your own currency 
In the first place, there is little or nothing useful that you can do with an 
Eastern Caribbean dollar, in any community that does not have access to US 
 
2 Full dollarization for the Caribbean is not a new suggestion; it was first mooted for Jamaica 
in Hanke and Schuler (1995). 
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dollars. You cannot find anything to buy, because there will be no imported 
goods of any kind, and also no local production, because there is nothing 
that is produced in the Eastern Caribbean that does not use some essential 
imported material or equipment. Equally, you will not be able to produce 
food for yourself, or make clothing or shelter, because there is no-one from 
whom you can purchase equipment and materials. Our economies prosper 
to the extent that there is an ample inflow of foreign currencies, which may 
be spent on the imports we consume and use in domestic production.  
Companies and individuals who earn foreign currency are privileged, 
compared with those who are paid in local currency, in much the same way 
as Haitians who speak English are at an advantage, compared with those 
who only speak creole (kreyol ayisyen). Having your own currency gives a 
good feeling, but it actually makes second-class citizens of the less well-to-
do.  
Secondly, your local currency is not a good choice for placing your 
savings, because its value may be depreciated, relative to the US dollar, at 
the time when those savings are needed. Guyanese and Jamaicans who 
retired in the 1980s and 1990s found that the value of their pensions had 
shrunk to the point where they were entirely dependent on the charity of 
their offspring for their livelihood. Even in Belize, the ECCU and Barbados, 
where there has been no devaluation, people prefer to save in US dollars if 
they can, just in case. Local currency deposits and securities are an inferior 
option, which will be chosen only if you have no US dollars. 
Thirdly, local currencies are in danger of devaluation whenever 
government's operating expenses exceed tax revenues for several years 
running. In these circumstances government accumulates unproductive 
debt, debt that does not contribute to the provision of communications, 
roads, ports, or lasting upgrades of health, educational and social services. 
Because Government's borrowing does not contribute to additional 
knowledge and capacity to earn foreign exchange, it does not generate a 
stream of revenues to service the loans contracted by Government. The 
result: in addition to meeting current import needs, some portion of the 
available supply of future foreign exchange must be set aside to service the 
new Government debt. That means less foreign exchange for current 
imports, and pressure for devaluation of the currency. 
In practice, having a local currency has facilitated wasteful government 
spending and reduced the incentives for the reorganisation and 
modernisation of the public sector, throughout the Caribbean. In the absence 
of a local currency, Government would be obliged to maintain credit 
worthiness in order to borrow in US dollars. That would be an incentive to 
raise public sector productivity and resist the more egregious forms of 
pointless job creation. With its own currency, Government can make a great 
show of passing legislation for central bank independence, while continuing 
with policies that undermine the value of the currency. 
The threat of domestic currency depreciation brings challenges that 
inhibit the country's economic development prospects. It undermines 
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investor confidence, because prospective investors know that devaluation 
will be inflationary, and will trigger increases in import costs and unease and 
possible unrest in the labour force. Investment projects are put on hold until 
the threat of devaluation recedes. The threat of devaluation also leads to 
capital flight, as businesses and wealthy individuals switch to US dollar 
balances, pay off US dollar trade credits and borrow in local currency 
wherever they can.  
Depreciation of the domestic currency worsens the distribution of 
income. Wealthy households have access to US dollars through a variety of 
channels. They may own or manage international trading companies or 
financial institutions, they may have foreign clients, relatives or business 
associates, and they may have foreign sources of income. Their foreign 
income and income-earning assets protect them from the impact of currency 
depreciation. Public servants, persons employed in domestic activity and 
lower income earners are paid in local currency, and their avenues for 
converting to US dollars are limited. They cannot escape the inflation that 
comes with a devaluation of the local currency. Devaluation widens the gap 
between the haves, who can protect their income by switching to US dollars, 
and the have-nots, who are stuck with local currency which has lost some of 
its purchasing power. 
 
3. There are no benefits to having your own currency 
We are often told, by the IMF, journalists and commentators, that our 
countries may improve their competitiveness by devaluing the local 
currency.3 Anyone who has taken a basic course in economics should know 
that that is erroneous. Small producers operate in competitive markets in 
which their contribution to the market is too small to make a difference to 
the ruling price in the market. At the ruling market price they may sell 
everything they produce, so why would they want to offer a lower price? In 
the case of tourism, minerals and other Caribbean products, prices are 
denominated in US dollars. What determines the return to the Caribbean 
producer is the quality of the product or service, a factor which is unaffected 
by the devaluation of the local currency. The argument that devaluation 
increases competitiveness is totally without merit, no matter how often it is 
repeated. 
What is true is that devaluation reduces the wages of local workers, 
measured in US dollars. Hotels, restaurants and export activities become 
more profitable, at the expense of their workers. That does not seem to be a 
desirable outcome. 
The IMF and mainstream media also regularly state that countries with 
their own currencies may limit the extent of domestic inflation, by raising 
domestic interest rates when prices rise beyond a target level. That is also 
clearly erroneous. The principal factors affecting domestic inflation are the 
 
3 This opinion persists even when other influences on competitiveness are acknowledged; see 
Varela and Lovo, 2016. 
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prices of imports and the depreciation of the currency; domestic interest 
rates have no discernible effects on prices. 
There are positive spinoffs of using the US dollar exclusively for local 
transactions 
Government's fiscal indiscipline cannot erode the value of people's 
savings if there is no possibility of creating domestic credit to fund 
Government’s deficit. Government borrowing from the central bank would 
be limited to the amount of deposits placed with central bank by commercial 
banks, and would be used to smooth out government’s cash flow. 
Government finances would become subject to the discipline of the market. 
Government would be obliged to maintain a good international credit rating, 
and it would need to present careful and complete public documentation for 
projects for which it seeks funding. Public accounting for borrowings, 
including guarantees of the borrowing of state corporations, would be 
demanded by potential creditors, because they would be aware of the limits 
to Government's ability to borrow from the central bank. 
Fears of devaluation, shortages of foreign currency, exchange controls 
and the bureaucracy that surrounds them would be a thing of the past. The 
boost to investor confidence, the positive impact on the commercial 
environment and the improvement in the ease of doing business, would be 
notable.  
Exclusive use of US dollars would alleviate a major headache for the 
Caribbean and small countries around the world, namely the wholesale loss 
of correspondent relationships with international banks which deal in US 
dollars. The loss of correspondent banking relationships has inhibited 
remittances, turned away potential investment in international financial 
centres, and inconvenienced individuals who spend extended periods in the 
region and need to do business in local currency. 
How to retire the local currency 
The local currencies could be entirely redeemed by central banks by 
purchasing and importing US currency notes and coin, using their existing 
foreign reserve balances. Central banks and monetary authorities in the 
Caribbean all have foreign reserves sufficient to purchase US notes and coins 
to replace the full issue of local currency at prevailing exchange rates (See 
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Table 1. Currency Issue and Foreign Reserves, Local Currency 
Country Currency Issue Foreign Reserves Date 
Aruba, Fl.m 336 1636 Dec 2018 
Bahamas, Bh$m 304 1182 Dec 2018 
Barbados, Bd$m 732 991 Dec 2018 
Belize, Bz$m 376 575 Jan 2019 
Bermuda, Br$ 124 154 Dec 2017 
Curacao, St M. Gm 458 3140 Dec 2018 
DR, Pesos, b 123 367 Dec 2018 
Guyana G$b 106 112 Dec 2018 
Haiti Gourdes, b 44 165 June 2018 
Jamaica, J$b 94 400 Dec 2017 
Suriname    
T’dad-Tobago, TT$b 8 53 Dec 2018 
Sources: Central bank websites 
 
All deposits and other liabilities of the banking system are held in digital 
records, and are matched by an equal amount of credit and other assets, also 
held in digital form. All that would be required for these balances is to covert 
both sides of the balance sheet from local currency to the US dollar 
equivalent at the prevailing exchange rate. 
 
4. Objections that may be offered to full dollarisation 
It is sometimes argued that in the absence of exchange controls the local 
economies would be denuded of investment or, conversely, overrun by 
foreign investment. In fact, investment is attracted to the Caribbean because 
of competitive advantages and the prospect of profitability; the existence of 
exchange controls slows down potential investment inflows, and their 
removal would eliminate this obstacle. Some also argue that there would be 
danger of environmentally damaging or other inappropriate investment, or 
massive investments that may transform the landscape in socially 
undesirable ways. These dangers should be managed by planning, 
environmental and other legislation and regulation. 
There is an objection raised that the US Federal Reserve would not 
approve of the domestic use of US dollars. The issue of Federal Reserve 
approval does not arise because the Caribbean central banks would have no 
authority to issue US currency. Caribbean central banks would continue to 
buy and sell US dollars from the Fed as they do now, as the local demand for 
currency varies. The Fed would continue to manage such US dollar assets as 
central banks might deposit with them from time to time. No change in the 
current arrangements is necessary. 
The IMF frowns on the use of US dollars as the national currency. This 
would be a problem for countries such as Barbados which has a current IMF 
programme; the Barbadian Government would need to convince the Fund’s 
Board of Directors of the merits of full dollarisation.  
A problem would arise if the central bank lacks sufficient foreign currency 
to cover the outstanding currency with the banks and the public. In this case 
commercial banks might be willing to use their own foreign assets to retire 
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their holdings of local currency. However, at the moment no Caribbean 
central bank is in this situation. 
Dollarisation and national sovereignty 
Retiring local currency is seen by uniformed observers as a surrender of 
economic sovereignty.4 In fact, exactly the opposite is true: exclusive use of 
the US dollar enhances the range of choice open to the country and its 
residents, in all international commerce, because such transactions are 
conducted in US dollars or in currencies that are convertible to US dollars. 
In contrast, with Barbados dollars you cannot buy or sell anything in nearby 
St Lucia, much less in the rest of the world. In a world where payments and 
settlement are digitized, with no need for notes and coin, there is no limit on 
the commercial and financial sovereignty of holders of the US dollar. 
It follows that the use of an independent local currency limits a country’s 
sovereignty, because it limits the ability to engage in international 
commerce. The GDP of Barbados in 2018 was about US$5 billion, but the 
country had access to less than US$3 billion of international goods and 
services, because that was the total availability of US dollars and other 
foreign exchange from exports, tourism and other services, and foreign 
financial inflows. Once the economy is fully converted to US dollars and the 
local currency fully retired, the entire US$5 billion may be used to obtain the 
best value for money, in transactions anywhere in the world.  
It is evident from Panamanian experience in the wake of the release of the 
“Panama Papers” that full dollarization does not safeguard a country against 
the risks in international commerce, including the reputational risks. 
Arguably, however, full dollarization mitigates the effects of adverse 
circumstances, and strengthens to country’s resilience in the face of such 
events. Had Panama boasted its own currency, the release of the Panama 
Papers would undoubtedly have led to capital flight, major currency 
depreciation and a big jump in domestic inflation, all with long-term damage 
to economic growth prospects and economic stability. In the event, the 
economic damage was limited to the international financial services sector 
and services such as real estate which depended on that sector. 
Experiences with full dollarisation 
The Latin American and Caribbean region offers three examples of full 
dollarization: Panama, which has always used US dollars as local currency; 
Ecuador, which abandoned the local currency in 2000; and El Salvador, 
which replaced local currency gradually, starting in 2002. Their growth and 
inflation performance since 1990, relative to the regional average, is shown 




4  In private correspondence Hilbourne Watson explains that the notion that sovereignty 
empowers a country is the result of confusion about states, power and sovereignty: “This 
notion derives from reading international law in a linear way that fosters the impression 
that to be sovereign necessarily implies substantive equality, even though international law 
does not produce equality among states.”   
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Source: ECLAC Annual Statistical Report 2017 
 
In Figure 1 we see that Panama’s growth has significantly outrun that of 
Latin America and the Caribbean since 1990. At the end of 2016, Panama’s 
annual GDP was over four times as large as it was in 1990, compared with 
the regional average, which was less than double. Panama’s GDP rose faster 
that the regional average consistently over the past three decades. Ecuador 
and El Salvador also outperformed the regional average, but less 
spectacularly. In the case of Ecuador, in the earlier years when it still retained 
its own currency, growth was no better than average, but the growth rate 
accelerated past the regional average after full dollarization. In 2016 
Ecuador’s GDP was 222 percent of the 1990 figure, compared with the 
regional average of 173 percent. The relative growth of Salvadorean GDP 
shows no noticeable change during the period of full dollarization. The 
economy fell into recession five years later, but by 2016 it was slightly ahead 


































































































































Dollarised Countries- Growth Comparison
LAC Ecuador El Salvador Panama
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Source: ECLAC Annual Statistical Report 2017 
 
Panama’s inflation performance bettered the regional average by a wide 
margin (see Figure 2a). Relative to international prices, Panama’s domestic 
prices in 2016 were only 84 percent of what they were in 1990. In the past 
decade domestic prices in Panama have risen more slowly than international 
prices, whereas for the region the slowdown of domestic prices is noticeable 




Source: ECLAC Annual Statistical Report 2017 
 
In Ecuador, domestic prices rose much faster than international prices 
prior to full dollarisation (Figure 2b). Dollarisation in 2000 was accompanied 
by a sharp correction, which brought domestic prices in line with the 














































































































































































































































Inflation Comparison - Ecuador
LAC Ecuador
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doubled in the next three years. Since then domestic price increases have 
been in line with the regional average, though there have been wide 
fluctuations over the years. In El Salvador domestic price increases levelled 
off after full dollarization, ending the period very close to the regional 




Source: ECLAC Annual Statistical Report 2017 
 
These illustrations are not intended to demonstrate the benefits of full 
dollarisation. That would require an in-depth analysis of the circumstances 
of each country, taking account of economic structures and policies, and of 
international economic activity, among the many relevant issues which are 
beyond the scope of this essay. The growth and inflation data are intended 
only to allay fears about the possible adverse consequences of full 
dollarisation. However, the conclusion that dollarization appears to be 
beneficial is corroborated by others, including Hanke (2021). 
The smaller the country, the more obvious the benefits of full 
dollarization seem to be. Steve Hanke (forthcoming) lists 37 small countries 
and territories that are fully dollarized: American Samoa, Andorra, Bonaire, 
the British Virgin Islands, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Cook Islands, 
Northern Cyprus, East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gaza, Greenland, 
Guam, Kiribati, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
Montenegro, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, Norfolk Island, the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Palau, Panama, Pitcairn Island, Puerto Rico, San Marino, Tokelau, 
the Turks and Caicos Islands, Saba, Sint Eustatius, Tuvalu, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, Vatican City, and the West Bank of Palestine. This list includes 


























































































































Inflation Comparison - El Salvador
LAC El Salvador
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5. Are the currencies of all small economies doomed to 
extinction? 
The currencies which will have the longest life are those whose 
governments have consistently observed the Golden Rule: the government’s 
expenditure on current operations and debt service should at all times be less 
than the revenues from taxation. In this way there is always a small surplus 
available to contribute to the replacement and modernization of equipment, 
property and infrastructure, and the entire amount of government 
borrowing is devoted to investment projects. Governments which observe 
the Golden Rule borrow from their central banks only to even out their cash 
flow, and amounts borrowed in advance of periodic tax returns are fully 
paid off with the receipt of the anticipated taxes. Central bank credit to 
government does not increase over time, and there is no pressure on foreign 
reserves, which can be maintained at a level sufficient to protect the 
exchange rate against a loss of value over the long term. For such 
governments the fact that their currency retains its value against the US 
dollar and other international trading currencies, and the adequacy of their 
foreign reserves, are easily identifiable markers of good financial 
management by government. A country with this reputation earns a high 
credit rating in international financial markets. The only remaining value of 
having your own currency, therefore, is as a signal that government is 
committed to sound financial management. When that is no longer the case, 
the currency will depreciate, and the process of replacing it with US dollars 
will accelerate, beginning with the wealthiest in society. It then makes sense 
to retire the domestic currency in a quick and orderly process, rather than 
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